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Col. Ware

Let me first give you my background in Viet Nam.
advisor, the first one they had in

1

67 and

1

68.

I was a Ranger
A mechanized infantry

battalion, part time brigade with the 25th Division, southwest of
Saigon.

In

1

up near Huay.

71 and

1

72 I had a brigade with the 101st ___ Division,

I saw quite a bit of the country.

Your interest in

tactics, in counter insurgency tactics - I was lucky enought the first
time to go to the Military Assistance Institute and we had a guest
speaker that many people had not heard of then named Bernard Fall.
I got to know him fairly well over the next several years.

His book

was not out yet, that is his first book, Street Without Joy, My wife
looked for it and sent it over to me and I got the fist copies in Viet Nam.
It gave a pretty good view of the war then, an encapsuled view.

And

while we were there, we tried to study what the French had done, what
they'd done right, what they'd done wrong.

What the Viet Minh had done.

Everyone started getting interested in counter insurgency.

And they

wanted to try to find out what happened in Malaysia and in the Phillipines
They sent me down to Malaysia for a fortnight to go through the jungle
warfare school there.

At the time I was there they had active counter

insurgency going on up in the North.

I remember coming back and writing

a paper to the chief MAAG (military assistance advisory group) telling
him what I thought the differences were between the situation in Malaysia
and South Viet Nam and they were considerable.

Some of those differences,

one would be control for one thing, the administration.
had control in Malaya.
retained control.

The British still

They had granted independence, but they still

The ethnic breakout of the insurgents was different in

Malay than it was in Viet Nam.

In Malaya the insurgents, of course, were

Chinese, and the Malayan population didn't like the Chinese.
Malayse against Maylayse, but Malayse against Chinese.
of the problem was entirely different.

It was not

The magnitude

Through most of the war the

biggest attack, the Communist terrorists could muster was about a platoon.

And even by 1961, the VC were mounting battalion sized attacks.

And

there were a whole host of things, geography, political, ethnic differences,
much greater than was the case in Malaya.

So it should not have been a

question of what worked in one environment to another.

To include

the idea of strategic hamlets, which worked well in Malaya, because there
weren't that many people involved there and these people weren't tied to
the land as the Vietnamese were tied to their homes.

You uproot those

people and you create many more problems than you would have done by doing
nothing.

You try a strategic hamlet in Viet Nam and every province chief

vies with others to make certain that his hamlets look more strategic than
the others.

Such a hamlet or province chief would put a string of barbed

wire around the hamlet and say it was a strategic hamlet.
weapons and the VC would knock them off the next night.

Issue a few
They did not

do the thorough kind of preparation on the strategic hamlets that had
been done in Malaya.

They did not have the administrative machinery,

they did not have the bureaucracy that the Malayse had .

It was entirely

different.

Currey

Why did we go so for fortified hamlets?

For awhile that was the thing

that was really going to save South Viet Nam.

Ware

Right, the people, I thought, could not understand the difference between
Malaya and Vietnamese.
we were fighting.
resources.

They did not understand the problem or the enemy

They tried to do too much too fast without sufficient

You realize that at that time after Diem was killed,

they were changing the government almost on a monthly basis.

And when the

government changed all the province chiefs changed, all the district chiefs
changed way down the line.

There was constant turmoil.

And many of those

who were in control were Catholics from the North who had no real feelings
for the people in the South over whom they were administering.

People

who were Southerners were Buddhists or some kind of animists as opposed to

the Roman Catholic administrators and they were not communicating with their
own people.

Background, aspirations were very different.

continuity and the great competition ruined the program.
there, his brother Nhu was in charge of the program.

Lack of
When Diem was

And Nhu was exhorting

people to build more and faster and to outdo each other and it was all paper
tiger.

Currey

Was the body count going on at that time?

Ware

I don't think they called it that at that time.
track of casualties.

In every war people keep

You kill so many, you wound so many, you normally

try to keep track of such casulaties.

The term "body count" instead

of something like comparative casualties or simply casualty list was
probably an unfortunate choice.
obviously.

Some peopl~ did go to ridiculous extremes,

To exaggerate the enemies' casualties and to minimize our own.

The difficult thing about the body count was the
back in the United States.

Currey

visions it caused people

It seemed cold blooded.

I understand, also, in helping to establish body counts, they counted
blood trails and weapon finds and so forth.

Ware

Yes, I think that was going on.

If one finds a lot of bloody bandages someplace

or other, you can estimate that you've hurt somebody.
through

I remember going

- when my Ranger company was ambushed - behind a clump of banana

trees, there were some brains there, you could pretty well establish that
that man was dead - the brains it belonged to.
And the Americans got totally involved in it.

Currey

How long would you say it was a guerilla war?

Those things go on.

Ware

Throughout, but the emphasis changed.

I'm sure you're familiar with the

three phases of Mao's Revolutionary War.
purely and solely guerilla war.

Initially, Phase I is always

Then they start _ _ _ up training

and equipping then in Phase II they're still on the strategic defensive, but
the tactical offenses.

Meanwhile, however, the peasant population is

supporting the guerrillas, giving them places to hide, giving them food
providing resources to main force units.

And then even in Phase III, which

is total offensive, guerrilas were still doing their thing
one way it was a guerilla war throughout.
the guerillas were much less important.
wiped out.

So that in

Except, that after TET 1 68,
Because, they were pretty well

When, they through the dice, the gamble for the allout win,

and lost they suffered tremendous casualties.
towns and the villages was low.

Their infra structure in the

And was after TET that the North Vietnamese

began operating on a large scale, although they had been operating in smaller
numbers even previously.
the Khesanh.

Currey

They didn't joint the main attacks except around

They were always just simply to back up the VC.

You mentioned Khesahn.

Why would we defend a place like that, so totally

and so completely and then just immediately evacuate?

Ware

Have you read Westmorland's book?
it.

He gives there his rationale for doing

His hope was to hang on to that place as a point of departure or base

if you will, in case he ever got authority to escalate the war, he would
have troops on station in a place where it could start from.

After TET,

it became quite obvious that we were not going to be granted all the
resources that we might want or desire .

And, so in Westmorland's mind there

was no longer any reason to contiue to hold Khesahn and so it was
evacuated.
Phu.

Everybody looked at Khesahn and said and American Dien Bien

Yet, it's hard to compare Kheshan and Dien Bien Phu .

It was useful

perhaps as a magnet to bring Vietnamese forces in where they could get
zapped by preponderant American strength.

So perhaps, it served a

purpose after all.

Currey

There is a question Colonel that I would like you to think about, it
runs something like this.

When, on our side, the war became a large unit

conflict, against large scale Vietnamese efforts, why was our fire power
and mobility and our long military experience, why didn't we win?

Ware

We won all the big battles, we lost the war.

Because we were fighting

the wrong kind of war.

Currey

How do you mean that?

Ware

We were emphasizing the physical aspects of strategy and tactics.

And we

didn't fully understand the psychological aspects which applied in Viet
Nam.

So, while winning the vast majority of the big battles, we did not

obtain political objectives.

(SECOND INTERVIEW - COL. TOM WARE)

Currey

Well, Col. Ware, do you think, and you would be in a good position to
know, here at the War College, - Are lessons learned from Viet Nam
really being absorbed by the Army?

Ware

Not yet.

Not yet.

I have a study project here that's just getting under

way to examine this peculiar effort.

l

To find from it the lessons learned.

The Amry has been ducking its responsibilities.
not just the Army.

The government has also

I think that as our longest and most traumatic war

and one we can truly say we lost, we've got to look inside.

Not for

scapegoats, not for witchhunts, but in an objective responsible way
without biases.

And to say - what does it all mean .

There are many

things in there that cover similar if not identical situations .

Currey

Ware

Could you hold forth on some of those thoughts for a few moments.

Well, now the study hasn't really gotten started yet.
some thinking about it.

I've given a few talks around the area.

are my own personal thoughts.
things I am not.
I don't think so.
think so.

But I've done
These

I start out with about six caveats of

Perhaps we're still too close to it to study it but
Perhaps we are too emotionally involved, but I don't

What some of those caveats.

I can't get rid of my own objectivity.

Well, I'm not an academic expert;
The matter is complex and sensitive

There's a voluminous amount of wheat and chafe possibly it's too soon.

There

are problems with the lessons and extrapolations and thus it's much a case
of finding the correct identity.
objectives.

To begin with, we had a shifting set of

First, we wanted an independent South Viet Nam.

interested in containing the spread of monolithic Communism.

We were
Thirdly,

we wanted to defeat refolutionary warfare or wars of national liberation.
Fourthly, we wanted to improve U.S. credibility and resolve world wide
Fifthly, we did not want to lose our first war. Sixth, we wanted to save
U.S. pride and prestiege and not lose faith.

Seven, return of US POW

MIA personnel. And lastly, a peace -with honor.

And we have some dilemmas

if we should be faced with a similar situation.

We would have to consider

good versus bad wars, short versus long wars, necessary versus unnecessary
wars, near versus far wars, cheap versus expensive wars in terms both
of dollars and people, total versus limited wars, clear versus vague and
shifting results, victory versus indecisive results, the regulars versus
our boys.

Currey

It's too bad, isn't it, that the regulars are never anybody's boys.

They're

mercenaries.

Ware

The list goes on.

Fair versus unnecessary burdens, David versus Goliath

political theirs versus patriotic ours.

And here are some other thoughts

there may be some that are repititious.

The stab in the back syndrome

that is where the military complains that they could have won had they
not been held back by political forces within the civilian population
as the Germans did in WWI and as the French did in North Africa .

Where

the military might say, "look, we won all the battles, but you feliows caused
us to lose the war. 11

Where the military was turned off against the government

and turned against them.
happen after Viet Nam.

You guys lost the war.

But in the U.S. that didn't

General Smith quite often has made the point and made

it quite well, that the military swallowed and stepped forward and moved
out after Viet Nam.

Questions raised both by Viet Nam and Watergate - that

is distrust of leaders.
of military force.

Civil and military.

Peace with honor.

Usefulness

Have we lost our national will or determination.

we and/or should we be number one?

Are

Is correlatior of forces or momentum of

history on the side of the US of the USSR.
replaced by "sorry, sir, can't do. 11

Should the can do spirit be

And/or shouldn't do.

can do attitude was one of our big problems.

You see this

The military would be given

a mission and they weren't consulted and were left out of the decision and
still said "can do. 11

If they had understood the war, the would have

realized the chances of winning were nil and would have said so.
cost would be great .

The

Some of them should have stood up to their leaders

and said we can't do this with these constraints - we can't do this.
11

Currey

Ware

11

Is this really possible in the military?

Yes, I would.

Of course, I've been around a long time and I've only got

a year to go before I retire.

But I believe that's what we should do .

Currey

Could you have done that as a major?

Ware

Oh yeah.

I would have done it as a lieutenant, a second lieutenant.

Currey

OK, how widely do you think your feelings might be shared by others?

Ware

Not enough.

I think Gen. Smith feels the same way .

Unfortunately,

we don't have enough of that kind who are able to say, "sorry sir, can't do. 11
First, I don't think enough of our military every really understood the
kind of war we were going to fight in Viet Nam.

We though once we got

in there with our fire power, our mobility, our technology, that we
could do it.

Filled with this "can do

11

spirit.

of some of the catch words we used in Viet Nam.

This optimism.

Think

Bait and trap, search

and destroy, Gen. DePew suggested that one to Gen. Westmorland.

Then

there was rice assault, that's where you sent someone out to see is rice
stored supplies.

But all these gimicks that were tried usually they

lasted through one commander.

Then someone else would change them.

search and destroy became reconnaisance and force.
other things that need to be considered.
of the USA in the world.

Well, there are

For example, what is the role

Credibility of the USA.

how should forces be inserted into action.

And

Why, when, where and

And all of this things the

military certainly were touched by Viet Nam and Watergate.

What

the military must do is understand what kind of war it's fighting and
the people that will be involved therein.

Currey

Col. do you know, did your paths every possibly cross that of Lt. Col.
Gene Sauvageot?

Ware

Yes, I think so.

Currey

Sauvageot has told me in the past that he has written, out of his own
vast experience in Viet Nam, - report after report, which he filed, but
which he honestly didn't believe that anyone actually even ever read.
Do you think that was an occurance shared by others?

Ware

Well, you know happened to John Paul Van in the "can do" era.
was optimistic , Van's was not, he was a pessimist.

The attitude

Perhaps Van overstepped

his role there but nevertheless he was probably right.

More right than

they were in Saigon, but Saigon did not listen to him.

He was more realistic

than they were - he knew the situation better.

And he was able to see things

and hear things and store them up in his mind, yet.

What Van was saying

was totally out of synch with reports eminating from headquarters in
Saigon.

And there were a number of people like that.

what he wants to hear.

Currey

A person hears

That's military history.

In light of many of the reports that were being submitted from the field,

it is amazing how headquarters at various levels could be so determinedly
optimistic in their own views.

Ware

Well, as those reports went up through the chain of command they were
filtered.

I guess any bureaucracy· has things go up the chain they are

softened, compromises are made .

Things are toned down.

Until originally

a red flag being waved ends up as another color of flag entirely.

Currey

Col. I'll have to tell you a story.

A few years ago while on bivouac, I

and the chaplain happened to walk into a tent where a sex movie was being
shown.

And it was a pretty bad sex movie.

ravished by a dog.

There was this woman being

And I caused the projector to be stopped and I

submitted a report that I was pretty unhappy with the sort of movies that
were being shown to the men.

That they should not be allowed.

And that

report went to brigade which submitted a report to higher headquarters that
the chaplain was rather unhappy with the quality of movies being shown.
Battalion's report was forwarded to brigade that the chaplain had noted
that the men were watching movies.

Brigade forwarded to division that

the chaplain noted that the men's recreational needs were being taken care
of by showing movies to them.

That's probably in effect the same sort

of filtering you have in mind with regard to the reports, the negative
reports about field activities that were submitted in Viet Nam.

Ware

Other factors that would need to be taken into consideration in future wars
would be proportional means, used for specific ends.
of it.

Lessons from Malaysia and other places.

Continuity or lack

Working with the government

of Viet Nam trying to work at all levels to achieve ends.

We must remember

that we Americanized the war without having total control of the situation
there and that was very difficult.
we should have Americanized the war .

It was their country I'm not sure
But nevertheless, we did Americanize

it.

We had too many people there, civil and military giving advice.

of them not really qualified.

It overburdened the system.

Many

We didn't

understand their problem, and I don't think they understood ours.

Currey

With reference to overwhelming Col. Be of the National Training Center of
Viet Nam was recently telling me that the yearly military budget for
South Vietnam was 5 times , no military aid, was 5 times the size of their
national budget.

And their national budget was 3 times the size of their

gross national product.
burdening.

So this would truly be overwhelming and over-

That's an awful lot of money pouring, ruining an economy.

factors that would be considered in - political lessons.

Other

National strategies,

objectives, the role of dissent in and out of the United States.

International

RVN, Democratic Republic of North Viet Nam and the USSR, NATO and others.
War, immoral and/or illegal.
things more immoral than war .

Wars are always immoral but there's sometimes
All of those things that I've been suggesting

are strawmen but they're good catch words.
burning his house.

Killing a man is worse than

You can -get awfully involved arguments on this.

it justifiable or not.

WAs

I understand that at the War College, you now

have a Department of Ethics .

Ware

Not a department.

Rather it's a part of the command and management thing.

They're working out ethics of war.

Currey

What was your view Col. about the constant changing of battalion commands.
Was this a mixed, blessed bag?

Was it a positive factor, was it a negative factor on morale and aon
unit integrity.

Ware

The six month tour was negative on balance .
year tour and that was better .

It was later changed to a one

The six month tour caused constant

turmoil.

A man getting used to his unit, the men getting used to him,

getting used to the environment, and most of them were ambitious.
not bad.

And that's

Ambitious people are the ones that do things and the fellows who

wanted to make their mark in six months.
time they had,

That was it, that was all the

That was during Viet Nam the most critical thing in a

man's military career.

If he didn .' t have that on his records, as a combat

arms officer, or if he didn't do well at it while he was in command,
then his chances of going to a senior service school or receiving further
promotion were nil.

So these people went all out to make their record

in that short length of time.

Currey

What in your view would be an optimum time for command?

Ware

I think a year or 18 months.

Of course, in a peacetime environment it's

18 months or 2 years for battalion and brigade commanders.

Currey

If you have a bad one, two years is a long time.

How much of an intensive

study will this committee have here.

Ware

Currey

Ware

It's about a 2 year effort.

How many people will be involved?

It will vary.

We'll have a number of people to include major contractors

over a 14 month period.

We have a horizontal approach here where as

study team chairman will have his own cadre to bring in advisors as they
see fit.

It's unofficial, it's unblessed, open book.

perspective.

From the army

We tend to isolate in this study the Army from the rest of

the sister services.

At least we're going to tell the sister services

how our action impinged upon theirs and theirs upon us.

How we saw

things, what we did and how our actions affected other people.

Trying

to get some focus on this thing of Viet Nam.
who will volunteer to do some pieces of it.
the students.

We'll have some students
0 yes, we will involve

We have a Viet Nam elective here for the last 2 years.

And I've been monitoring it and that's been helpful to us.

Ge.

Westmorland has come twice, the Chief of Staff, people from state, all
of them will be adding their perspective.

USIA, the AID people.

of these people have been starting to have second thoughts.

A lot

And are

saying I really see where we made this mistake or that mistake or when
the joint chiefs are stuck in here .
multiple input sort of thing.
in the study.

We'll have work shops, symposia,

We'll have 60 categories or sub-topics

And we'll try except where we have to prove a point to stay

out of the tactical area.

Try to keep it on a higher level.

grand strategy and in the national strategy.

Grand tactics,

